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Legal Constraint of Genetic Use Restriction 
Technologies* 
Dan L. Burk** 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Gene splicing techniques have enabled the creation of 
many types of sexually reproducing plants with commercially 
attractive characteristics: increased nutritional value, 
resistance to drought and pests, herbicide resistance, medicinal 
properties, and many other valuable attributes.1  In many 
quarters, such transgenic alterations to plant varieties have 
been controversial.  But even more controversial has been the 
application of recombinant DNA technology to restrict the use 
of beneficial plant varieties.2  These genetic use restriction 
technologies, or GURTs, curtail the saving of seed from year to 
year by rendering the progeny of proprietary seed sterile.3  
Although the deployment of this technology has for the moment 
been restrained by adverse publicity, continued research and 
continued commercial interest in its application suggest that it 
is a question of when, not whether, the technology will be 
deployed. 
I have examined elsewhere the conceptual ramifications of 
this technology on intellectual property law and policy, and will 
not rehearse that discussion here.  In this essay, I intend to 
focus upon the doctrinal issues undergirding an analysis of 
GURTs deployment.  Here I examine the public policy factors 
                                                          
 * Copyright 2004 by Dan L. Burk. 
 ** Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly Professor of Law, University of 
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 1. See Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed 
Wars, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 268-76 (2003). 
 2. See, e.g., Martha L. Crouch, Edmonds Institute, How the Terminator 
Terminates: An Explanation for the Non-Scientist of a Remarkable Patent for 
Killing Second Generation Seeds of Crop Plants (1998), at 
http://www.edmonds-institute.org/crouch.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2004). 
 3. See id. 
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that determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of proprietary 
rights licenses that cover plant varieties; I argue that these are 
the same factors that would be considered in determining 
whether equivalent GURTs usage is legitimate or illegitimate; 
and I look at the key American legal decisions that might guide 
us in determining the legitimacy of GURTs deployment.  
Unfortunately, as I demonstrate in detail below, the cases that 
purport to guide decision-makers in this area are poorly 
decided and incoherent even on their own terms, let alone when 
extended to new methods of plant variety use restriction.  
Consequently, we must be wary of any confident 
pronouncements regarding the acceptability of, or regarding 
the extension of, such practices to GURTs deployment. 
I.  GENETIC USE RESTRICTION TECHNOLOGIES 
The economic challenge that impedes the development of 
new plant varieties is that plants naturally reproduce 
themselves.4  As a consequence, new varieties are relatively 
expensive to create,5 but are trivially inexpensive to propagate 
once they are in existence – and, indeed, may propagate 
unintentionally.  This “public goods” problem of distribution at 
a marginal cost close to zero is common in other areas of 
innovation, even where the subject matter does not reproduce 
itself.6  Legal prohibitions have been the typical solution to this 
problem.7  In the United States, trade secrecy and utility 
patents have been used to secure exclusive rights in transgenic 
plant varieties, as has a specific form of intellectual property 
granting plant breeders’ rights. The Plant Variety Protection 
Act (PVPA)8 is specifically directed at encouraging development 
of new varieties of sexually reproducing plants by granting the 
developer broad control over the growth, use, importation, and 
                                                          
 4. William W. Fisher, The Impact of Terminator Gene Technologies on 
Developing Countries: A Legal Analysis, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, 
AGRICULTURE, AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: THE DISTRIBUTIONAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 137, 139 (Timothy Swanson 
ed., 2002). 
 5. See id. 
 6. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). 
 7. See generally Peter J. Goss, Guiding the Hand That Feeds: Toward 
Socially Optimal Appropriability in Agricultural Biotechnology Innovation, 84 
CAL. L. REV. 1395 (1996) (reviewing legal protection for plant innovation). 
 8. Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (2000). 
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sale of a new plant.9  This statute includes some important 
exceptions to a seed developer’s control, such as provisions 
allowing farmers to save seed from a proprietary crop,10 or 
permitting agricultural research involving the plant.11 
However, plant variety owners might prefer that their 
control over the variety not be subject to such exceptions. 
Patent rights and trade secrecy may also be exhausted or 
surrendered with the sale of the protected article.  
Consequently, as a condition of access to their seeds, owners 
routinely require that farmers contractually waive their rights 
to save seed or engage in other legally permissible uses.12  
Often the terms of this contract are printed on or attached to 
the bag of seed; by using the seed, the contractual “fine print” 
purports that the farmer has agreed to the terms.13  However, 
it is difficult to police the use of seed and to enforce the terms of 
such “seed-wrap” licenses.  To do so, seed developers must send 
agents out into farmers’ fields to sample crops, looking for 
unlicensed users of proprietary seed.  When such uses are 
found, costly legal procedures may be necessary to halt the use, 
force acceptance of a license, or recover unpaid royalties. 
The problems of detection and enforcement might be 
lessened if seed could be designed to be “self-policing,” that is, 
unsuitable for use without the developer’s permission.  GURTs 
allow for the creation of such “self-policing” seed.  Genetic 
elements that produce a toxin late in seed development may be 
introduced into the plant variety.14 The toxin kills the seeds 
after the plant has matured, producing a viable crop for the 
farmer, but forcing him to return to the seed producer for new 
seed each year.15  Even in the absence of a contractual 
obligation not to save seed, the technology makes saving seed 
impossible.  Thus, the genetically altered seed in essence 
carries within its own makeup a prohibition on unlicensed use. 
Indeed, the prohibitions embedded in such genetic code 
may be quite sophisticated.  In one embodiment of the 
technology, it is possible to introduce into the seed a genetic 
                                                          
 9. See Aoki, supra note 1, at 284. 
 10. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543. 
 11. See id. § 2544. 
 12. See Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, Intellectual Property Protection for 
Plant Innovation:  Unresolved Issues after J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 20 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1161, 1163-64 (2002). 
 13. See id.  
 14. See Crouch, supra note 2. 
 15. See id. 
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“switch” that will repress, or turn off, the toxin production 
when the seed is exposed to a particular chemical.16  This, in 
effect, supplies a chemical “password” to activate germination, 
which can be used to control the terms of seed usage from year 
to year.17  Yearly application of the control chemical, obtained 
from the seed owner for payment, would allow the owner to 
activate or deactivate seeds in return for prescribed payment.18  
One can easily envision other types of switches, sensitive to 
temperature, precipitation, soil alkalinity, or other 
environmental factors, that could be used to limit use of the 
seed to certain geographical regions or seasonal applications.  
Indeed, plants could be engineered for various desirable 
properties - pest resistance, drought resistance, superior yield, 
and so on - and particular attributes activated or deactivated 
depending on the price paid by the purchaser. 
The description of seed licensing offered above bears an 
uncanny resemblance to the history of content licensing in 
digital media.  Copyright law affords the owners of digital 
content some recourse against many unauthorized uses of their 
material,19 but copyright is subject to a host of consumer uses 
that require no authorization from the copyright holder.20  
Owners of digital content, much like seed owners, have long 
wished to escape the consumer privileges afforded by copyright 
law.21  They have done so through the fiction of the mass-
market or “shrink-wrap” license, which purports to restrict a 
purchaser’s use of the accompanying product.22  But judicial 
treatment of these licenses has been mixed,23 and it is still 
extremely difficult for copyright holders to police such 
agreements.24  Consequently, copyright owners have begun 
deploying sophisticated software “lock-out” systems that 
prevent access to digitized content except on the terms dictated 
                                                          
 16. See id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Charles R. McManis, The Privatization (or “Shrink-Wrapping”) of 
American Copyright Law, 87 CAL. L. REV. 173, 175 (1999). 
 20. See id. at 175-76. 
 21. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1266 (1995). 
 22. See id. at 1241-48; McManis, supra note 19, at 174. 
 23. See Lemley, supra note 21, at 1248-59; McManis, supra note 19, at 
182-83. 
 24. See Lemley, supra note 21, at 1263. 
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by the owner.25 
The implications of this development are striking.  As both 
Larry Lessig and Joel Reidenberg have pointed out, the design 
of technical standards confers upon the designer the power to 
govern behavior with regard to that system.26  Once constraints 
on behavior are built into the technical standards governing a 
technology, the technical standards effectively become a new 
method for governing use of that technology – in essence, the 
technical standards become a type of law.27  Such technical rule 
sets may supplement or even supplant the legal rule sets 
designed to govern the same behavior.28  The development of 
technological use controls, whether in software or transgenic 
corn, may substitute private technological rules for the public 
statutory rules declared by Congress in the Copyright Act29 or 
PVPA.30  Where control over the design of information rights is 
shifted into the hands of private parties, those parties may or 
may not honor the public policies that animate public access 
doctrines such as fair use31 or a “farmer’s exemption.”32  Rights-
holders can effectively write their own intellectual property 
statute in either software or DNA.  Producers who employ lock-
out technology may in essence become private legislatures, 
imposing rules of usage without regard to the broader public 
interest that informs democratic rule-making. 
Since technical controls can impose conditions that 
formerly might have been the subject of a detailed license 
                                                          
 25. See Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 
1132 (2003) [hereinafter Anticircumvention]; Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, 
Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 41, 83 (2001); see generally Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the 
Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out” 
Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1995).  
 26. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 86 
(1999) (the design of Internet technology imposes the behavioral regulation on 
its users); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of 
Information Policy Rule Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554 (1998) 
(“Technological capabilities and system design choices impose rules on 
participants.”). 
 27. See Reidenberg, supra note 26, at 55. 
 28. See LESSIG, supra note 26, at 213-30 (describing the interplay between 
technology systems and government regulation); Reidenberg, supra note 26, at 
55 (arguing the policymakers must understand technology networks in order 
to regulate them). 
 29. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).   
 30. Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (2000). 
 31. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).   
 32. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2543-2544 (2000).    
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agreement, such controls might be viewed as equivalent to a 
sort of licensing regime.33  But such a comparison to contract 
law by no means justifies employment of technical controls that 
contravene established public policy.  Carte blanche 
enforcement of private agreements has never been the rule in 
Anglo-American law.34  When such agreements are found 
illegal, unconscionable, or simply in violation of public policy, 
they are held unenforceable.35  Because contract law is state 
law,36 enforcement of a contract that would violate the public 
policy inherent in the federal intellectual property scheme, or 
embedded in the Constitution itself, is preempted.37 
By the same token, if technical constraints mimic law, it 
may be that those mimicking illegitimate contractual terms 
should be considered prohibited, preempted, or void.  This point 
has perhaps been argued most forcefully by Julie Cohen, who 
suggests that the coercive power of the state should be 
extended in support of technological constraints no farther 
than it may be to enforce statutory or contractual constraints.38  
Stated differently, where federal law, public policy, or the 
Constitution impose limits on the government’s creation and 
recognition of property rights in intellectual goods, those limits 
would apply equally to both legally and technologically 
delineated property.39 
II.  THE LIMITS OF CODED REGULATION 
This equation of technology with law may seem at first 
somewhat abstract, so let me offer a fairly clear-cut scenario 
that illustrates the problem.  Consider for example a patent 
license with a term that extends beyond the term of the 
underlying patent.  The United States Supreme Court has long 
held that such licenses constitute per se patent misuse, as an 
attempt to extend the patent owner’s exclusive rights beyond 
                                                          
 33. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright 
and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 
479, 493-96 (1995). 
 34. See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of 
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 158-71 (1999). 
 35. See id. at 151; O’Rourke, supra note 33, at 529. 
 36. See Lemley, supra note 34, at 158. 
 37. See id at 161-62; O’Rourke, supra note 33, at 528-34. 
 38. See Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management 
Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 
172-79 (1997). 
 39. See id. 
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the period set by Congress.40  This rule has been periodically 
vilified by commentators41 and by certain judges42 as 
economically irrational, but it remains the law.  Even the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which 
has been notably hostile to the patent misuse doctrine, 
recognizes the continued viability of the rule.43 
Presumably, then, a license directed to a patented plant 
variety, whether that license is a formally negotiated arm’s 
length transaction or a mass-market “seed wrap” license 
attached to a bag of seed, would constitute patent misuse if the 
term of the license extends beyond the term of the patent.  The 
license would likely be unenforceable on a variety of grounds, 
including pre-emption of the state-law contract by federal 
patent policy, being similarly void for public policy reasons, and 
perhaps even being unconscionable.  Indeed, the underlying 
patent itself might be held unenforceable until the misuse 
constituted in the license was purged. 
Consequently, the proper treatment of such a license 
seems relatively straightforward: it is unenforceable.  The 
harder question is whether we would permit the deployment of 
genetic use restriction technology that accomplished essentially 
the same goal as the license: extending the exclusive rights of 
the patent holder beyond the term of the patent.  Indeed, the 
exclusivity conferred by technological restriction may be far 
more complete than that conferred by a legally enforceable 
license: legal safeguards are far “leakier” than technological 
safeguards.44  Where exclusivity over a plant variety is 
conferred by a contract, the purchaser may decide to breach the 
agreement, risk detection of the breach, and risk possible 
enforcement of the agreement.  But technical protections are 
not so easily ignored; absent a high degree of technological 
                                                          
 40. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942) (“A 
patent operates to create and grant to the patentee an exclusive right to make, 
use and vend the particular device described and claimed in the patent.  But a 
patent affords no immunity for a monopoly not within the grant . . . .”). 
 41. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Note, The Economic Irrationality of the 
Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1618-19 (1990) (criticizing the 
misuse doctrine on the grounds that the remedy unnecessarily rewards 
infringers). 
 42. See, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510 (7th 
Cir. 1982). 
 43. See Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997). 
 44. See Goss, supra note 7 (discussing the limitations of existing legal 
protections). 
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sophistication, the purchaser will not have the option of 
ignoring an unwelcome, overreaching, or even illegal restraint 
on use of the plant variety.45 Consequently, technological 
control over a patented plant variety could extend well beyond 
the life of a patent. 
Note that this outcome could be contrived through a 
variety of strategies.  Deployment of the GURT itself might 
confer an extended quasi-monopoly over use of the genetic 
invention so long as the technical protection is not easily 
circumvented and the entry of competing plant varieties into 
the market is impaired.  More likely, the GURT might be 
coupled with contractual terms that extend the term of 
exclusivity beyond that of a patent.  For example, the GURT-
protected variety might be accompanied by a license that, 
rather than being directed to genetic improvement that is the 
subject of the expired patent, is directed to the GURT itself – 
GURTs may themselves be patentable, and a license for use of 
a GURT-protected variety might effectively capture the value 
of a genetic modification protected by the GURT.  The 
accompanying license might also be styled as permission to 
access the GURT-protected variety: GURTs can be designed to 
be deactivated by a particular chemical “password,” and an 
accompanying license might purport to trade GURT 
deactivation for agreement not to save seed, reverse engineer 
the seed, and so on.46  
This in turn suggests that the GURT-enabled license could 
be styled as a confidentiality agreement or license to use a 
trade secret.  But treatment of an expired patent as a trade 
secret is problematic in a variety of aspects.  The Supreme 
Court held long ago that state trade secrecy law is not 
preempted by Federal patent policy because the two cannot 
conflict.47  The Court reasoned that the election to patent an 
invention requires disclosure that would obviate trade 
secrecy.48  In theory, a third party could follow the information 
disclosed in the patent – perhaps with the aid of materials 
publicly deposited by the patent holder – to create a competing 
version of the variety.  But given the extreme concentration of 
the seed industry and the barriers to entry,49 such follow-on 
                                                          
 45. See generally Crouch, supra note 2. 
 46. See generally id. 
 47. See Kewaunee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974). 
 48. See id. at 490-93. 
 49. See Aoki, supra note 1, at 254-55 (noting that ten seed companies 
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“generic” variety development may be infeasible.  The initial 
developer of the variety may be able to maintain a position of 
market domination, particularly when locked into such a 
position by a combination of technological and licensing control. 
In such a scenario, the status of the GURT-enabled license 
is unclear.  While patent law as a general rule does not 
normally pre-empt trade secrecy,50 perhaps it would do so in 
this particular circumstance, or perhaps the license would be 
found unenforceable on other grounds.  If so, perhaps the use of 
technology to achieve these same ends would be equally 
illegitimate, and fair game for circumvention.  To the extent 
that circumvention of the GURT is prohibited by a patent 
covering the GURT, employment of that patent to effectively 
extend the exclusivity in the restricted variety might constitute 
misuse. 
But in order to reach such a result, the technical protection 
must be considered equivalent to a prohibited or disfavored 
legal restriction.  This requires sorting legitimate GURT 
deployment from illegitimate deployment, which in turn 
requires clear direction as to the public policy behind such 
exclusive rights.  Several cases appear to deal with just these 
questions, addressing the licensing of plant varieties under 
patent and trade secrecy, as well as examining the interaction 
between these forms of intellectual property and the PVPA.  
Unfortunately, a review of the cases dealing with such rights 
indicates that they are anything but clear on the relevant 
policies that might be applicable to GURTs deployment. 
III.  THE LIMITS OF TRADE SECRECY 
Use of valuable plant varieties could, in theory, be 
restricted by the law of real property, by withholding the 
variety from public access.  This strategy would of course defeat 
the purpose and the incentive for developing new varieties.  
The legal analog to protection by seclusion is that of trade 
secrecy; the owner of the variety can legally prohibit or restrict 
access to property that is not generally available, even when 
restrictions on physical access to that property are not wholly 
feasible.51  GURTs allow the variety developer to achieve 
                                                                                                                            
control about forty percent of the global seed market). 
 50. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 
1243 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that patent and trade secret law can “peacefully 
coexist”). 
 51. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(1), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985) (“Trade 
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something quite similar, both distributing the variety and 
simultaneously restricting its use.52  Restriction of plant 
variety usage via GURTs or GURTs-enabled licenses may most 
closely parallel protection via trade secrecy, and so the 
treatment of plant varieties under trade secrecy may give some 
guidance as to their treatment vis a vis GURTs. 
At least one U.S. court has held that the genetic 
composition of proprietary seed is protectable as a trade secret, 
although under facts and procedural circumstances that could 
limit the decision’s wider applicability.  In Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International v. Holden Foundation Seeds, Inc.,53 the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a trial court award of damages 
for misappropriation of the “genetic message” contained in 
hybrid seed corn.54  The defendant, Holden, was accused of 
developing hybrid corn from misappropriated Pioneer seed 
lines.55  Expert testimony regarding the accused seed suggested 
that it was genetically related to the proprietary seed, and 
most likely derived from the proprietary seed.56  Holden was 
unable to show that it did not derive its seed from Pioneer’s.  
Although Holden did show evidence that Pioneer’s seed had 
been publicly available on some occasions,57 it did not show 
that it had obtained Pioneer seed from public sources.58  The 
court held that absent a showing that the accused seed was 
obtained via publicly available sources, an inference could be 
drawn that access to the seed came via improper means.59 
This result is troubling due to the court’s position that 
genetic information, even in grain that may have been publicly 
accessible, was rendered proprietary by the developer’s 
expenditures on confidentiality.60  This result depends upon on 
older trade secrecy cases, grounded in the Restatement of 
Torts,61 holding that public availability of a purported trade 
                                                                                                                            
secret’ means information . . . that derives independent economic value, actual 
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons . . . .”). 
 52. See generally, Crouch, supra note 2. 
 53. 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 54. See id. at 1241. 
 55. See id. at 1229. 
 56. See id. at 1229-35. 
 57. See id. at 1236. 
 58. See id. at 1238. 
 59. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 35 F.3d at 1240-41. 
 60. See id. at 1236. 
 61. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757A (1939) (“One who 
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secret is relevant only if the defendant in fact obtained the 
information from those public sources.62  This conclusion 
probably would not have been reached under more recent 
conceptions of trade secrecy law, such as the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act,63 which indicates that information does not qualify 
for trade secrecy if it is either “generally known” or “readily 
ascertainable by proper means.”64  Indeed, as the court in 
Holden itself recognized, and as I have articulated at greater 
length elsewhere,65 trade secrecy interpreted in such a manner 
may well run afoul of federal patent policy by withdrawing 
from the public domain unpatented and unpatentable 
information that the federal patent system intends for public 
availability.66 
The defendant in Holden also argued that the federal 
PVPA preempted trade secret protection of the proprietary 
hybrid seeds.67  The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument, 
stating first that the legislative history of the PVPA showed no 
evidence that Congress intended to preempt state plant variety 
protection.68  Citing the Supreme Court holding in Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp.69 for the proposition that patent and trade 
secret can “peacefully coexist,”70 the appellate court in Holden 
implied – alas, without analysis—that the federal PVPA and 
state trade secrecy could similarly coexist.71 
                                                                                                                            
discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to 
the other if (a) he discovered the secret by improper means”). 
 62. See, e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 
(5th Cir. 1970). 
 63.   UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). 
 64. Id. § 1(4)(1) (“Trade secret’ means information . . . that derives 
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally 
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other 
persons . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 
cmt. f (1995) (stating that information that is “generally known” or “readily 
ascertainable through proper means” by others is not protectable as a trade 
secret). 
 65. See Dan L. Burk, Misappropriation of Trade Secrets in Biotechnology 
Licensing, 4 ALBANY L.J. SCI. & TECH. 121, 126-28, 130 (1994); see also 
Kewaunee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
 66. Burk, supra note65, at 126-128, 130. 
 67. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 
1242 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 68. See id. at 1243 
 69. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
 70. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 35 F.3d at 1243 (citing Kewanee Oil, 416 
U.S. at 474). 
 71. See id. 
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The court’s cursory recitation on preemption indeed tracks 
the correct form of a preemption inquiry,72 although perhaps 
telescoping some steps of the analysis together.  Where state 
and federal regulations overlap, a court properly asks as an 
initial matter whether the statute contains explicit language 
indicating Congressional intent to preempt state law.73  If such 
language is found, the court must still determine the scope of 
preemption, but need not infer intent to preempt.74  If there is 
no explicit language regarding preemption, the court must infer 
whether or not Congress intended to preempt state law.75  
Preemption, whether express or implied, may constitute either 
“field” preemption, in which Congress intends to eject the 
states from the entire field of regulation at issue,76 or “conflict 
preemption,” in which the particular statue at issue conflicts 
with some Congressional objective embodied in a federal 
statute.77  In the latter case the particular state regulation is 
invalidated, although other, non-conflicting state regulations 
might be permissible.78  Conflicts are often detected by asking 
whether the state statute either “stands as an obstacle” to a 
federal purpose or disrupts the “delicate balance” struck by 
Congress in fashioning the federal statute.79 
In holding that the federal PVPA and state trade secrecy 
can “peacefully coexist,” the Eighth Circuit recites a conclusion 
that implies conflict preemption analysis.  But the superficial 
treatment in Holden unfortunately lacks the substance to 
actually resolve the question posed; it reaches a conclusion 
regarding conflict preemption, but on grounds that sound in 
field preemption.  Certainly the PVPA contains no express 
language regarding preemption, either in the legislative history 
or in the statute itself.  Turning then from express preemption 
to implied preemption, it indeed seems unlikely that Congress 
intended entirely to eject the states from the field80 of plant 
variety protection – such field preemption is relatively rare and 
typically occurs in matters of uniquely national or federal 
                                                          
 72. See id. at 1242. 
 73. See Dan L. Burk, Protection of Trade Secrets in Outer Space Activity: 
A Study in Federal Preemption, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 560, 597 (1993). 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. at 599. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. at 606. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See Burk, supra note 73, at 606. 
 80. Perhaps an unfortunate metaphor in this instance. 
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concern, where there is simply no room for states to engage in 
regulation.81  Plant variety protection would not seem to be 
such a uniquely federal area, nor is federal regulation so 
pervasive as to exclude any opportunity for state regulation of 
the matter. 
But this does not answer the question as to whether state 
trade secrecy law, or even the contract on which trade secrecy 
may be premised, stands as an obstacle to federal policy, 
requiring application of narrower conflict preemption.  This 
inquiry is based not on explicit statements by Congress, but by 
the structure, purposes, and effects of the federal statute 
considered.82  If the state regulation frustrates Congressional 
purposes, then the court should infer that Congress intended or 
would have intended preemption.83  There exists a very real 
possibility that trade secrecy presents such an obstacle.  For 
example, the PVPA contains an explicit research exemption, 
allowing protected varieties to be used in the development of 
new varieties.84  The facts of the Holden case involve just such 
varietal development.85  Extension of trade secrecy to the 
development of new varieties could well block Congressional 
intent to further such research.  Moreover, the research 
provisions exist as a result of the Congressional compromises 
negotiated among the parties affected by the PVPA.  
Application of trade secrecy could be seen as disturbing the 
“delicate balance” struck by Congress among the competing 
interests of seed owners, farmers, and follow-on researchers. 
 Neither is the Supreme Court analysis regarding patent 
law and trade secrecy especially helpful—much less 
dispositive—where a different statute, embodying different 
policies, is concerned.  Much of the holding in Kewanee rested 
upon the assumption that trade secrecy will never divert 
eligible information from the patent system,86 and that the 
choice between patent and trade secrecy is binary: information 
publicly disclosed in order to obtain a patent cannot be kept as 
a secret,87 forcing inventors to make an election between the 
                                                          
 81. See Burk, supra note 73, at 599. 
 82. See id. at 606. 
 83. See id. at 606-07. 
 84. See 7 U.S.C § 2544 (2000).  
 85. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 
1228-29 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 86. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489-90 (1974). 
 87. See id. at 481. 
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two.  The first part of this assumption is a questionable 
hypothesis, even for the patent system.  Trade secrecy is 
subject to cessation due to independent discovery or reverse 
engineering,88 but can in theory last perpetually, so long as the 
information remains undisclosed.89  Thus the inventor’s choice 
is an election between twenty years of certain patent protection 
or perpetual, but less certain, trade secret protection—a choice 
that in any given instance hardly can be said to have a foregone 
outcome. 
But the second assumption of Kewanee—that the election 
of protection must be either patent or trade secrecy due to 
disclosure—is entirely inapplicable to the PVPA context.  
Inventions can be kept either as a patent or as a trade secret; 
the choice to patent by definition destroys trade secrecy.  From 
the standpoint of disclosure, the election is binary, so that only 
one mode of protection can be operating at a time, and there is 
no opportunity for interference between the two.  But plant 
variety protection does not necessarily put a varietal developer 
to such an election of disclosure or non-disclosure.  Indeed, a 
more recent case, Advanta USA, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International, Inc.,90 rests its mistaken preemption holding on 
precisely this observation.  Rejecting a PVPA preemption 
challenge to Wisconsin trade secrecy law, the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held that because 
the PVPA does not require detailed disclosure, there is no 
actual conflict between concurrent PVPA and state trade 
secrecy protection of hybrid plants.91 
Consequently, the Kewanee rationale tells us little about 
whether the PVPA and trade secrecy can peacefully co-exist; 
there is no required election between the two. The court in 
Advanta failed to consider that the state law might stand as an 
obstacle to the purposes of federal statute, and that under the 
logic of Kewanee, the lack of actual conflict may signal the 
presence of a conflict with Congressional “purpose or 
objective.”92  Trade secrecy could well operate simultaneously 
with the PVPA to frustrate the function of the statute; and, to 
                                                          
 88. See Burk, supra note 73, at 589. 
 89. See id. 
 90.  No. 04-C-238-S, slip op. (W.D. Wisc. Oct. 27, 2004). 
     91.  Id. at 18-20. 
 92.   Id.  Indeed, when combined with the Supreme Court’s result in J.E.M. 
v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, this result effectively writes the PVPA out of existence.  
See infra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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the extent that GURTs function as a technological equivalent 
to trade secrecy, they may do the same.   Trade secrecy could 
well operate simultaneously with the PVPA to frustrate the 
function of the statute; and, to the extent that GURTs function 
as a technological equivalent to trade secrecy, they may do the 
same. 
IV.  THE LIMITS OF OVERLAPPING EXCLUSIVITY 
The question raised in Holden as to the potential for 
overlapping regimes of protection also arises with regard to 
patent law and plant variety protection.  In the case of 
overlapping utility patents, however, limitations will arise out 
of horizontal conflicts between the two federal statutes, rather 
than  vertical conflicts between a federal statute and a state 
statute.  The permissibility of overlapping patent and PVPA 
protection has been addressed by the United States Supreme 
Court in the much-ballyhooed decision J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. 
v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International,93 where the defendant, 
accused of saving seed in violation of a patent-based 
“seedwrap” license, challenged the propriety of utility patent 
protection for plants.94  The applicability of utility patents to 
plant varieties was upheld by the Court in an astonishingly 
badly reasoned opinion authored by Justice Thomas.95  
Although the analytical sins of the opinion are legion, I shall 
focus only upon the two most directly germane to the question 
of GURTs deployment. 
The first of these deals with overlapping intellectual 
property regimes.  The J.E.M. opinion both assumes and 
asserts that intellectual property regimes with overlapping 
subject matter are quite routine, even unremarkable.96  To 
support this proposition, Justice Thomas relies upon citations 
to the Court’s previous opinions in Kewanee Oil and Mazer v. 
Stein.97  But these decisions are at best irrelevant, and may 
indeed point in the opposite direction from Justice Thomas’ 
claim.  Neither case in fact dealt with overlapping intellectual 
property regimes.  In Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp.,98 the Court 
                                                          
 93. 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
 94. See J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 128-29. 
 95. See id. at 145. 
 96. See id. at 144. 
 97. Id. (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974) 
and Mazer v. Stein, 374 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)). 
 98.  416 U.S. 470 (1974).  
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held that state trade secrecy law is not preempted by the 
federal intellectual property;99 but this result was based on the 
assumption that the two forms of intellectual property 
protection are mutually exclusive: to obtain patent protection, 
one must disclose the invention in the published patent 
document, thus forgoing trade secrecy.100 
Similarly, Mazer v. Stein101 considered the division 
between what have traditionally been the subject matters of 
patent and copyright – the utilitarian and the aesthetic.102  But 
far from allowing the two to overlap, the opinion keeps them 
distinctly compartmentalized.  The opinion in Mazer is famous 
for establishing the rule that functional aspects of 
copyrightable works are not covered by copyright.103  Only 
aesthetic portions of the work, to the extent that they are 
physically or conceptually separable from the work’s functional 
aspects, can be protected by copyright.104  And, in order to keep 
the two intellectual property regimes separate, should the 
utilitarian and aesthetic portions of the work prove inseparable 
or inextricably co-mingled, copyright protection becomes 
unavailable.105 
The inapposite nature of these decisions to Justice 
Thomas’s reasoning is not only ironic, but altogether prophetic 
with regard to overlapping patent protection for transgenic 
plants.  The rule established in Mazer has proven to be 
exceptionally important for software, which is one of the very 
rare artifacts that can be simultaneously subjected to both the 
patent and copyright regimes.  Copyright has no purchase 
impact on software to the extent that it is functional—only the 
literal code and non-functional aspects of its structure can be 
protected by copyright.106  This in turn allows copyright’s fair 
use doctrine107 to provide an effective reverse engineering 
                                                          
 99. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 493. 
 100. See id. at 491-92. 
 101. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
 102. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 211-19. 
 103. See id. at 218 (“We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the 
argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for 
copyright bars or invalidates its registration”). 
 104. See id. (discussing the clear distinction between copyright and patent 
law). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 130-35 (2000). 
 107. See generally Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in 
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1181-1211 (2000). 
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privilege for software.108  Courts have held that the creation of 
intermediate or temporary copies, made in the course of 
accessing uncopyrighted and unprotectable aspects of the 
program, is fair use.109 
To the extent that patent law may be available to protect a 
computer program’s functional aspects, it may serve to override 
or negate this reverse engineering privilege.110  Patent law 
includes no fair use provision,111 nor indeed much else in the 
way of user privileges or exemptions.112  This has been a source 
of concern to commentators reviewing the state of the software 
industry, as software innovation depends upon 
interoperability,113 and patents may serve to block the 
development of interoperable products.114  The introduction of a 
fair use doctrine, or its equivalent, into patent law has been 
suggested to alleviate this problem.115 
The negation of exemptions and privileges by overlapping 
patent protection in software is precisely the same problem 
elided by the Court in J.E.M.;116 and this leads us to the second 
key analytical flaw in the opinion.  Much of the holding in 
J.E.M. rested upon the questionable conclusion that the patent 
and PVPA statutes are in some fashion compatible,117 so that 
no inference might be drawn that Congress did not intend the 
two statutes to overlap.118  But in fact this conclusion of 
                                                          
 108. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in 
the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 3, 17 (2001). 
 109. See O’Rourke, supra note 107, at 1220-21 (citing Atari Games Corp. v. 
Nintendo of America Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992) and Sega Enters. Ltd. 
v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 110. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 108, at 17-21. 
 111. See id. at 6. 
 112. See id. at 6. 
 113. See Cohen, supra note 25, at 1093. 
 114. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 108, at 5-6.  
 115. See id. at 37; O’Rourke, supra note 107, at 1230-35; see also Burk, 
supra note 106, at 151-58. 
 116. See J.E.M. Ag  Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 
140 (2001). 
 117. See id. at 140-41. 
 118.  And indeed, when combined with cases holding that there is no 
conflict between the overlap of PVPA and trade secrecy essentially reads 
PVPA out of existence: if a plant developer has the election between robust 
patent protection for 20 years, or perpetual protection under trade secrecy, it 
is difficult to see when he would ever opt for PVPA protection that is shorter 
than trade secrecy and weaker than patent.  See supra note 92 and 
accompanying text.  Some commentators have suggested that PVPA is indeed 
unnecessary and redundant.  See generally Mark D. Janis and Jay P. Kesan, 
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compatibility is blatantly wrong in a number of respects, 
particularly in that patent protection is entirely incompatible 
with the research and farmer’s exemptions in the PVPA.  The 
overlay of patent law onto PVPA subject matter negates these 
exemptions in the same fashion that patent protection 
overrides the reverse engineering exemption for software.  
Whatever public benefit or constituent balance Congress 
intended for the exemptions is thus lost, much as it would be 
with the overlay of GURTs upon plant varieties. 
This problem is not new to Supreme Court jurisprudence; 
indeed, overlapping intellectual property protection has posed a 
problem in a variety of situations where one form of intellectual 
property threatens to disrupt the substantive limits or policy 
balance of another.  Instead of looking to the inapposite 
Kewanee Oil and Mazer decisions, the Court in J.E.M. might 
better have looked to Supreme Court precedent in the area of 
trademark law, where the court has repeatedly expressed its 
concern that overlapping patent and trademark protection not 
be permitted to disrupt federal patent policy.119  While the term 
of patent protection has been carefully limited by Congress,120 
trademark or trade dress protection can last as long as the 
owner of the mark continues to use it in commerce – 
theoretically forever.121   
The Court has repeatedly held that one form of intellectual 
property cannot be used to subvert the limits of another. In 
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,122 the Court held that 
consumer recognition of a distinctively shaped “shredded 
wheat” biscuit could not be used under law of trademark to 
extend a patent owner’s rights beyond the term of the patent on 
the biscuit.123  The Court reaffirmed that principle with regard 
to distinctively shaped traffic sign assemblies in Traffix 
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.124 – a case decided just 
                                                                                                                            
U.S. Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury . . .?, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 727 
(2002).  But the statute does exist, and until Congress repeals it, demands 
that the intellectual property system should be envisioned so as to give it 
effect. 
 119. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 
(1995) (explaining patent concerns underlying the trademark functionality 
doctrine). 
 120. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).   
 121. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (2000). 
 122. 305 U.S. 111 (1938). 
 123. See id. at 119-20. 
 124. 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001). 
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before J.E.M., but curiously not mentioned in the opinion.  The 
principle is not limited to patent law; in Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,125 the Court held that 
documentary films for which copyright had lapsed could not be 
protected under the Lanham Act’s false designation of origin 
provision.126  The reasoning in J.E.M. sits uncomfortably amid 
these decisions, offering little indication that the confluence of 
patent and PVPA protection is more acceptable than the 
confluence of patent and trademark, or copyright and 
trademark. 
V.  THE LIMITS OF SEEDWRAP LICENSING 
The question of overlapping patent and PVPA protection in 
turn implicates the licensing of patented plant varieties.  The 
jurisprudence of utility patent licensing for plants could closely 
parallel the employment of GURTs and GURTs-enabled 
licenses for plants, either because the technological protection 
confers exclusivity analogous to patent protection, or because 
the GURT itself is patented, and tampering with it may trigger 
patent liability.  Patent rights are extensive, but they are not 
unlimited, and their exercise may be constrained by the 
doctrines of exhaustion, misuse, or by antitrust 
considerations.127  These doctrines might similarly be recruited 
to constrain analogous GURTs deployment. 
The limitations on patent “seedwrap” licensing have been 
addressed in the Monsanto Co. v. McFarling (McFarling I)128 
litigation, another lawsuit dealing with seed saved in violation 
of a “seedwrap license.”129  Prominent among defendant 
McFarling’s arguments against the enforceability of the license 
was that of patent exhaustion: the patentee’s loss of right in a 
particular patented item after it is sold.130  Patent exhaustion 
is often compared to the first sale doctrine in copyright,131 as 
each constitutes a mechanism of a more general policy 
disfavoring restraints on alienation.  In each case, an 
                                                          
 125. 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 126. See Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 38. 
 127. Id. at 662-63; United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251-52, 
(1942). 
 128. 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 129. See McFarling I, 302 F.3d at 1294. 
 130. See id. at 1298. 
 131. ROBERT E. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1023 (3d ed. 2002). 
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intellectual property owner’s rights in the physical object sold 
to another are exhausted, although the intellectual property 
rights in the intangible work remain.  In the particular case of 
patent exhaustion, the patent owner’s rights to a particular 
embodiment of the claimed invention are exhausted after 
transfer, although he may still hold the right to prevent 
making, use, sale, offering for sale, or importation of the 
claimed invention.132 
But patent law differs from copyright in an important 
respect.  In copyright, the division between the exclusive rights 
in the work and the right to dispose of the copy are relatively 
pristine.  Copyright excludes only certain uses of the tangible 
copy,133 and first sale speaks to only one of these, the right of 
distribution.134  But unlike copyright’s first sale doctrine, 
patent law’s exhaustion doctrine is entangled with the 
exclusive rights of the patent owner, which include the right to 
exclude all uses.135  Thus, sale of a patented item is typically 
assumed to entail a license for the normal and customary “use” 
of the product – the purchaser would be highly unlikely to 
purchase a product which he was excluded from using in any 
manner whatsoever. 
In challenging the Monsanto “seedwrap” agreement, 
McFarling argued that Monsanto’s rights in the seeds and their 
progeny were exhausted upon sale of the seed.136  The Federal 
Circuit looked to their recent jurisprudence holding that patent 
exhaustion can be negated by explicit terms in the sale or 
license of the patented product, reasoning that the restrictions 
in the “seedwrap” license covered the seeds actually sold, and 
that the sale of the seeds conferred no implicit or explicit 
license to “construct new seeds.”137  Further, the court held that 
the new, second generation seeds themselves were not subject 
to exhaustion, because they were not sold to MacFarling, but 
were “made” by him from the first generation seeds that were 
                                                          
 132. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1942); 
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 279 (1942); Intel Corp. v. ULSI 
Sys. Tech., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 133. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 134. See id. § 109(a).  
 135. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). 
 136. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
[hereinafter McFarling I].  
 137. See id. at 1298-99 (citing B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
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sold.138 
This analysis is at best confused, failing to separate the 
interconnected issues raised by McFarling’s claim. The Federal 
Circuit plausibly answers the question as to whether the 
patent holder’s rights in the first generation seed were 
exhausted, but simultaneously sidesteps the question of 
whether the patent holder’s rights in the second generation 
seeds were exhausted.  It is simply contradictory and 
nonsensical for the court to state that the sale conferred only 
the right to use the original seeds, and that the “original sale of 
the seeds did not confer a license to construct new seeds.”139  
Using the original seeds necessarily entails the construction of 
new seeds; that is how seeds work.  Soybeans in particular 
would be worthless if the license to use them did not confer a 
license to “construct new seeds”; i.e., a second generation of 
soybeans to be harvested.  Although this may not necessarily 
be true of some other plants, such as cotton or flax, where the 
plant itself, rather than its seeds, is the desired product.140  But 
in the case of soybeans, the sale of the initial seeds must 
necessarily confer a license to “construct new seeds.”  There is 
no other reason for the farmer to have purchased them. 
Consequently, the question cannot be what usage 
constraints were placed upon the first generation seeds – 
clearly they were to be used to generate additional seeds.  The 
question is rather the legitimacy of the constraints imposed in 
the contract for sale of the first generation seeds upon the use 
of the second generation seeds, constraints requiring the 
purchaser to use the second generation seeds for food or 
another end product, and not for planting.  This is clearly a 
matter of imposing terms upon the purchaser of one product 
regarding another product not yet in existence at the time of 
the first product’s sale.  Stated differently, the legitimacy of the 
transaction depends upon whether the license for the use of the 
first generation seeds can permissibly “reach through” to 
constrain the use of the second generation seeds. 
The court seems to have realized this mistake, at least in 
part, in its subsequent McFarling II opinion addressing 
McFarling’s appeal from summary judgment, in which 
McFarling claimed that the terms of the license constituted a 
patent misuse, tying a license for the first generation seeds to a 
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license for the second generation seeds.141  There the Federal 
Circuit acknowledged that McFarling would plant and harvest 
the first-generation seeds in the identical fashion, whether he 
planned to replant the second generation seed or not;142 
consequently, the license must be imposing a prohibition on the 
use of the second generation seed rather than on the first 
generation seed.143  However, the court sidestepped the 
applicability of such a license to the second generation seeds, 
reasoning that since they must necessarily fall within the 
patent claims, a prohibition on their use fell within the scope of 
the patent.144  Hence, the prohibition could not constitute 
misuse. 
It is worth noting that the use of upstream patent licenses 
to constrain use of downstream products has become an issue of 
concern in other technologies, particularly in the 
pharmaceutical industry, where some commentators have 
suggested that the practice implicates both antitrust and 
patent misuse.145  In the case of patented seed licenses, the 
analysis is somewhat more complex; as the court noted in 
McFarling II, the derived product will always fall within the 
scope of the patent,146 which may or may not be the case with 
research products.  But even though the second generation 
seeds saved by McFarling fell within the scope of the Monsanto 
patent, this does not answer the question as to whether the 
licenses for the first and second generation seeds were tied, let 
alone whether they were impermissibly tied.  The analysis I 
have reviewed here demonstrates that a constraint on the use 
of the second generation seeds would constitute at least partial 
revocation of the implied license to use the second generation 
seeds, arising out of the license for the first generation seeds.  
If the licenses for each type of seed use can be said to function 
in different markets, and Monsanto’s market power in the 
market for first generation seeds is being used to leverage 
market power in the market for second generation seeds, then 
an argument for antitrust violation is at least feasible—and 
antitrust violations are per se misuse. 
                                                          
 141. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
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 142. See id. at 1342. 
 143. See id. at 1342-43. 
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The court in McFarling I rejected such claims as unproven, 
but this holding was primarily an evidentiary matter, without 
any serious analysis as to the dimensions of the relevant 
markets and Monsanto’s market power in those markets.147  In 
an increasingly consolidated seed industry, the concomitant 
concentration of patents and market power in the hands of a 
very few firms deserves more serious scrutiny.  Under such 
conditions, the technological “lock-out” effect of GURTs may be 
even greater than those of exclusive rights under patent law.   I 
have suggested elsewhere that anticompetitive conduct and 
misuse constraints ought to apply in the context of digital 
rights management,148 and they could equally well prove 
applicable in some situations of GURTs deployment. 
CONCLUSION 
Deployment of genetic use restriction technologies raises 
serious policy concerns over the substitution of private 
technological regimes for publicly enacted legal regimes.  The 
key cases regarding the application of patent, trade secrecy, 
and attendant licenses are analytically muddled even on their 
own facts, and offer dubious guidance outside their specific 
holdings.  Indeed, these cases leave open and unanswered 
numerous serious questions about the routine deployment of 
“seedwrap” licenses and about the intellectual property regimes 
applicable to transgenic plant varieties, let alone any new or 
more exotic set of issues.  Extending the results of such cases to 
technological substitutes is highly problematic, leaving the 
legal propriety of GURTs deployment in substantial doubt for 
the foreseeable future. 
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